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Abstract
“Church’s thesis” (CT) as an axiom in constructive logic states that every total function of type
N→ N is computable, i.e. definable in a model of computation. CT is inconsistent in both classical
mathematics and in Brouwer’s intuitionism since it contradicts Weak König’s Lemma and the fan
theorem, respectively. Recently, CT was proved consistent for (univalent) constructive type theory.
Since neither Weak König’s Lemma nor the fan theorem are a consequence of just logical axioms
or just choice-like axioms assumed in constructive logic, it seems likely that CT is only inconsistent
with a combination of classical logic and choice axioms. We study consequences of CT and its
relation to several classes of axioms in Coq’s type theory, a constructive type theory with a universe
of propositions which does neither prove classical logical axioms nor strong choice axioms.
We thereby provide a partial answer to the question which axioms may preserve computational
intuitions inherent to type theory, and which certainly do not. The paper can also be read as a
broad survey of axioms in type theory, with all results mechanised in the Coq proof assistant.
2012 ACM Subject Classification Theory of computation→ Constructive mathematics; Type theory
Keywords and phrases Church’s thesis, constructive type theory, constructive reverse mathematics
1 Introduction
The intuition that the concept of a constructively defined function and a computable function
can be identified is prevalent in intuitionistic logic since the advent of recursion theory and
is maybe most natural in constructive type theory, where computation is a primitive.
A formalisation of the intuition is the axiom CT (“Church’s thesis”), stating that every
function is computable, i.e. definable in a model of computation. CT is well-studied as part
of Russian constructivism [32] and in the field of constructive reverse mathematics [24, 11].
CT allows proving results of recursion theory without extensive references to a model of
computation, since one can reason with functions instead. While such synthethic developments
of computability theory [7, 35, 1] can be carried out in principle without assuming any
axioms [17], assuming CT allows stronger results: First, CT essentially provides a universal
machine w.r.t. all functions in the logic. Secondly, and as a consequence, CT allows to prove
negative results like the undecidability of certain problems. Such decidability results, for
decidability formulated in the logic itself, are – with no axioms present – logically independent.
It is easy to see that CT is in conflict with traditional classical mathematics, since the
law of excluded middle LEM together with a form of the axiom of countable choice ACN,N1
allow the definition of non-computable functions [43]. This observation can be sharpened
in various ways: To define a non-computable function directly, the weak limited principle
of omniscience WLPO and the countable unique choice axiom AUCN,N suffice. Alternatively,
Kleene noticed that there is a decidable tree predicate with infinitely many nodes but no
computable infinite path [27]. If functions and computable functions are identified via CT, a
Kleene tree is in conflict with Weak König’s Lemma WKL and with Brouwer’s fan theorem.
1 oftentimes denoted with AC0,0 in the literature
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2 Church’s thesis and related axioms in Coq’s type theory
It is however well-known that CT is consistent in Heyting arithmetic with Markov’s
principle MP [26], a consequence of LEM which given CT states that termination of compu-
tation is stable under double negation. Recently, Swan and Uemura [41] proved that CT is
consistent in univalent type theory with propositional truncation and MP.
While predicative Martin-Löf type theory as formalisation of Bishop’s constructive
mathematics proves the full axiom of choice AC, univalent type theory usually only proves
the axiom of unique choice AUC. But since AUCN,B suffices to show that LEM implies ¬CT,
classical logic is incompatible with CT in both predicative and in univalent type theory.
In the (polymorphic) calculus of (cumulative) inductive constructions, a constructive type
theory with a separate, impredicative universe of propositions as implemented by the proof
assistant Coq [42], neither AC, nor AUC or AUCN,N are provable. This is due to the fact that
large eliminations from most propositions are forbidden [33], meaning one can not recover a
function in general from a constructive proof of ∀x.∃y.Rxy. But like LEM, choice axioms
can be consistently assumed in Coq’s type theory [44]. It seems likely that the consistency
proof for CT in [41] can be adapted for Coq’s type theory.
This puts Coq’s type theory in a special position: Since to disprove CT one needs a (weak)
classical logical axiom and a (weak) choice axiom, assuming just classical logical axioms
or just choice axioms might be consistent with CT. This paper is intended to serve as a
preliminary report towards this consistency question, approximating it by surveying results
from intuitionistic logic and constructive reverse mathematics in constructive type theory
with a separate universe of propositions, with a special focus on CT and other axioms based
on notions from computability theory. Specifically, we discuss:
enumerability axioms (EA,EPF) and Kleene trees (KT) in Section 5
extensionality axioms like functional extensionality (Fext), propositional extensionality
(Pext), and proof irrelevance (PI) in Section 6
classical logical axioms like the principle of excluded middle (LEM, WLEM), independence
of premises (IP), and limited principles of omniscience (LPO, WLPO, LLPO) in Section 7
axioms of Russian constructivism like Markov’s principle (MP) in Section 8
choice axioms like the axiom of choice (AC), countable choice (ACC, ACN,N, ACN,B),
dependent choice (ADC), and unique choice (AUC,AUCN,B) in Section 9
axioms on trees like Weak König’s lemma (WKL) and the fan theorem (FAN) in Section 10
axioms regarding continuity like homeomorphisms between Baire space NN and Cantor
space BN, and Brouwer’s continuity principles (Cont, WC-N) in Section 11
The following diagram displays provable implications and incompatible axioms.
DNE LEM DGP WLEM ADC AC
MP LPO WLPO LLPO ACC ACN→N,N
Homeo(BN,NN) Homeo(NN,BN) WKL ACN,N WC-N
KT FAN AUCN,B
EPF EA CT
Fext
MP
PFP S-ACN,B
Fext
Cont
WLPO
Figure 1 Overview of results. → are implications, denotes incompatible axioms
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All results in this paper are mechanised in the Coq proof assistant and are accessible at
https://github.com/uds-psl/churchs-thesis-coq. The statements in this document
are hyperlinked to their Coq proof, indicated by a -symbol.
Outline. Section 2 establishes necessary preliminaries regarding Coq’s type theory
and introduces the notions of (synthetic) decidability, enumerability, and semi-decidability.
Section 3 introduces CT formally, together with the related axioms EA and EPF which do
not rely on models of computation. Section 4 contains undecidability proofs for various
formulations of the halting problem based on CT. Section 5 introduces decidable binary trees
and constructs a Kleene tree. The connection of CT to the classes of axioms as listed above
is surveyed in Sections 6 to 11. Section 12 contains concluding remarks.
2 Preliminaries
We work in the polymorphic calculus of cumulative inductive constructions as implemented
by the Coq proof assistant, which we will refer to as “Coq’s type theory”. The calculus is
a constructive type theory with a cumulative hierarchy of types Ti (but we leave out the
index from now on), an impredicative universe of propositions P, and inductive types in
every universe. The inductive types of interest for this paper are
n : N ::= 0 | Sn (natural numbers)
b : B ::= false | true (booleans)
o : OA ::= None | Some a where a : A (options)
l : LA ::= [] | a :: l where a : A (lists)
A+B := inl a | inr b where a : A and b : B (sums)
A×B := (a, b) where a : A and b : B (products)
One can easily construct a function 〈_ , _〉 : N → N → N and for all f : N → N → X an
inverse construction λ〈n,m〉.fnm of type N→ X s.t. (λ〈n,m〉.fnm)〈n,m〉 = fnm.
We write n =B m for the boolean equality decider on N, and ¬B for boolean negation.
If l : LA then l[n] : OA denotes the n-th element of l. If n < |l| we can assume l[n] : A.
We write ∀x : X.Ax for both dependent products and logical universal quantification,
∃x : X.Ax where A : X → P for existential quantification and Σx : X.Ax where A : X → T
for dependent sums, with elements (x, y). Dependent sums can be eliminated in arbitrary
contexts, i.e. there is an elimination function of type
∀p : (Σx.Ax)→ T.(∀(x : X)(y : Ax).p(x, y))→ ∀(s : Σx.Ax).ps.
In contrast, existential quantification can only be eliminated for p : (∃x.Ax)→ P.
An elimination of a proposition into a non-propositional context is called a “large
elimination” [33]. Crucially, the proposition ⊥ expressing falsity can be eliminated into
arbitrary contexts, i.e. ∀A : T.⊥ → A holds. We only need large elimination on one more
type to establish a guarded minimisation function as follows:
Lemma 1. There is a guarded minimisation function
µN : ∀f : N→ B.(∃n.fn = true)→ Σn.fn = true ∧ ∀m.fm = true→ m ≥ n
A restriction of large eliminations is necessary for consistency of the system. As a
by-product, the computational universe T is separated from the logical universe P, allowing
classical logic in P to be assumed while the computational intuitions for T remain intact.
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partA : T partial values over A : T
!= : partA→ A→ P definedness of values x != a1 → x != a2 → a1 = a2
(x : partA) ↓ : P x ↓ := ∃a.x != a
≡partA : partA→ partA→ P equivalence x ≡partA y := (∀a.x != a↔ y != a)
ret : A→ partA monadic return ret a != a
undef : partA undefined value 6 ∃a.undef != a
>>=: partA→ (A→ partB)→ partB monadic bind x >>= f != b↔ (∃a.x != a ∧ fa != b)
µ : (N→ B)→ partN unbounded search µf
!= n↔ fn = true∧
∀m ≤ n.fm = false
seval : partA→ N→ OA step-indexed evaluation x != a↔ ∃n.sevalxn = Some a
Figure 2 A monad for partial values
2.1 Partial Functions
All definable functions in type theory are total by definition. To model partiality, one often
resorts to functional relations or to step-indexed functions A → N → OB, as for instance
pioneered by Richman [35] in constructive logic. As of today there are various approaches to
model partiality in type theory, see e.g. [12] for an overview.
For our purpose, we simply assume a type partA for A : T and a definedness relation
!= : partA → A → P and write A 9 B for A → partB. We assume monadic structure for
part (ret and >>=), an always undefined value (undef), a minimisation operation (µ), and a
step-indexed evaluator (seval). The operations together with their specifications are depicted
in Figure 2. The monad can be implemented using several techniques, besides step-indexing
also using dependent pairs of proof-irrelevant propositions P and a function P → A [8].
2.2 Equivalence relations on functions
Besides intensional equality, we will consider other equivalence relations on functions in this
paper. For instance, extensional equality (∀x.fx = gx), extensional equivaelnce (∀x.fx↔ gx),
or range equivalence ∀x.(∃y.fy = x)↔ (∃y.gy = x). We will denote all of these equivalence
relations with the symbol ≡ and indicate what is meant by an index. E.g. ≡A→B denotes
extensional equality, ≡A→P extensional equivalence and ≡ran range equality.
Assuming surjections A → (A → B) may or may not be consistent, depending on the
particular equivalence relation. Formally, we introduce the notion of surjection w.r.t. ≡ as
∀b : B. ∃a : A.fa ≡
B
b. Similarly, we call a function f : A→ B an injection w.r.t. ≡
A
and
≡
B
if ∀a1a2. fa1 ≡B fa2 → a1 ≡A a2 and a bijection if it is an injection and surjection.
One formulation of Cantor’s theorem is that there is no surjection N→ (N→ N) w.r.t. =.
However, the same proof can be used for the following strengthening of Cantor’s theorem:
Fact 2 (Cantor). There is no surjection N→ (N→ N) w.r.t. ≡N→N .
2.3 Decidability, Semi-decidability, Enumerability, Reducibility
We define decidability, (co-)semi-decidability, and enumerability for predicates p : X → P:
Dp := ∃f : X → B. ∀x. px↔ fx = true (“p is decidable”)
Sp := ∃f : X → N→ B. ∀x. px↔ ∃n.fxn = true (“p is semi-decidable”)
Sp := ∃f : X → N→ B. ∀x. px↔ ∀n.fxn = false (“p is co-semi-decidable”)
Ep := ∃f : N→ OX. ∀x. px↔ ∃n.fn = Somex (“p is enumerable”)
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Although all notions are defined on unary predicates we use them on n-ary relations via
(implicit) uncurrying. We write p for the complement λx.¬px of p. We call a type X discrete
if its equality relation =X is decidable and enumerable if the predicate λx.> is enumerable.
In the literature propositions P s.t. P ↔ (∃n.fn = true) are often called Σ01 or “simply
existential”, and P s.t. P ↔ (∀n.fn = false) are called Π01 or “simply universal”. Semi-
decidable predicates are pointwise Σ01, and co-semi-decidable predicates are pointwise Π01.
Lemma 3. The following hold:
1. Decidable predicates are semi-decidable and co-semi-decidable.
2. Semi-decidable predicates on enumerable types are enumerable.
3. Enumerable predicates on discrete types are semi-decidable.
Lemma 4. Decidable predicates are closed under complementation. Decidable, enumerable,
and semi-decidable predicates are closed under (pointwise) conjunction and disjunction.
In contrast to predicative MLTT, Coq’s type theory does not prove the axiom of choice
since arbitrary large eliminations are not allowed, and neither the axioms of dependent nor
countable choice. As is well known [6], relying on Lemma 1 we can however prove:
Lemma 5. ∀X.∀R : X → N→ P. DR→ (∀x.∃n.Rxn)→ ∃f : X → N.∀x.Rx(fx).
As a consequence of Lemma 5 with no further reference to Lemma 1 we can then prove:
Lemma 6. The following three choice principles hold:
1. ∀X.∀R : X → N→ P. SR→ (∀x.∃n.Rxn)→ ∃f : X → N.∀x.Rx(fx).2
2. ∀Y.∀R : N→ Y → P. ER→ (∀n.∃y.Rny)→ ∃f : N→ Y.∀n.Rn(fn).3
Principle 2 can be relaxed to discrete types X instead of N.
3 Church’s thesis in type theory
Church’s thesis for total functions states that every function of type N→ N is algorithmic,
i.e. it is a relativisation of the function space N→ N w.r.t. a given (Turing-complete4) model
of computation which employs natural numbers to encode algorithms, reminiscent of the
axiom V = L in set theory [28].
All models of computation work equally well in principle. Since we want to mechanise our
proofs we could for instance formulate CT using the equivalent models of Turing machines [19],
the λ-calculus [16], µ-recursive functions [29], or register machines [15, 30]. However, since
no properties of the model are required, we can abstract away from a concrete model and
work with an abstract model of computation, consisting of an abstract computation function
T : N→ N→ N→ ON
assigning to a code c (to be interpreted as the code of a partial recursive function in a model
of computation), an input number x, and a step-index n an output number y in case the
2 A similar formulation of this result is due to Andrej Dudenhefner and was received in private commu-
nication.
3 A similar result was anticipated by Larchey-Wendling [29], who formulated it for µ-recursively enumerable
instead of synthetically enumerable predicates
4 Completeness commonly is defined as hardness (here: can simulate any other Turing-complete model
of computation) and containment (here: can be simulated by any other Turing-complete model of
computation). For our purposes, hardness suffices and models of computation with oracles are included.
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code terminates in n steps on x with value y.5 The function Tcx is assumed to be monotonic,
i.e. increasing the step index does not change the potential value:
Tcxn1 = Some y → ∀n2 ≥ n1. T cxn2 = Some y.
Based on T we define a computability relation
(c : N) ∼ (f : N→ N) := ∀x.∃n. Tcxn = Some (fx).
Since T is monotonic, ∼ is extensional, i.e. n ∼ f1 → n ∼ f2 → ∀x.f1x = f2x.
We define Church’s thesis for total functions:
CT := ∀f : N→ N. ∃n : N. n ∼ f
3.1 Bauer’s enumerability axiom EA
In proofs of theorems with CT6 as assumption, T can be used as replacement for a universal
machine. Bauer [1] develops computability theory synthetically using the axiom “the set of
enumerable sets is enumerable”, which is a strictly weaker consequence of CT, but also can
be used in place of a universal machine. We introduce Bauer’s axiom in our setting as EA′
and immediately introduce a strengthening EA s.t. CT→ EA and EA→ EA′:
EA′ := ΣW : N→ (N→ P).∀p : N→ P. Ep↔ ∃c. Wc ≡N→P p
That is, EA′ states that there is an enumerator W of all enumerable predicates, up to exten-
sionality. In contrast, EA poses the existence of an enumerator of all possible enumerators,
up to range equivalence:
EA := Σϕ : N→ (N→ ON).∀f : N→ ON.∃c.ϕc ≡ran f
That is, ϕ is a surjection w.r.t. range equivalence f ≡ran g, where ϕx ≡ran f ↔
∀x.(∃n.ϕcn = Somex)↔ (∃n.fn = Somex).
Note the two different roles of natural numbers in the two axioms: If we would consider
predicates over a general type X we would have W : N→ (X → P) and ϕ : N→ (N→ OX),
i.e. Wc would be an enumerable predicate and ϕc an enumerator of a predicate X → P.
We start by proving CT→ EA by constructing ϕ from T :
ϕc〈n,m〉 := if Tcnm is Somex then Sx else 0
Lemma 7. If CT then ∀f : N→ ON.∃c.ϕc ≡ran f .
Proof. The direction from left to right to establish ≡ran is based on the fact that if Tcxn1 =
Some y1 and Tcxn2 = Some y2 then y1 = y2. The other direction is straightforward. J
Theorem 8. CT→ EA
We now prove EA→ EA′ by constructing W from ϕ: Wcx := ∃n.ϕcn = Somex.
Lemma 9. If EA then ∀p : N→ P. Ep↔ ∃c. Wc ≡N→P p.
Proof. Ep↔ ∃f : N→ ON.∀x.px↔ ∃n.fn = Somex (def. E)
↔ ∃c.∀x.px↔ ∃n.ϕcn = Somex (EA)
↔ ∃c.Wc ≡N→P p (def. ≡N→P) J
Theorem 10. EA→ EA′
5 We choose the name T to be reminiscent of Kleene’s computability predicate, but immediately inline
the result extraction function U used by Kleene.
6 Note that from now on all axioms are hyperlinked to their definition.
Y. Forster 7
3.2 Richman’s Enumerability of Partial Functions EPF
Richman [35] introduces a different purely synthetic axiom as replacement for a universal
machine and assumes that “partial functions are countable”, which is equivalent to EA.
EPF := Σe : N→ (N 9 N). ∀f : N 9 N.∃n.en ≡N9N f
Theorem 11. EPF→ EA
Proof. Let e be given. ϕc〈n,m〉 := seval (ecn) m is the wanted enumerator. J
Theorem 12. EA→ EPF
Proof. Let ϕ be given. Then
ecx := (µ (λn. if ϕcn is Some 〈x′, y′〉 then x =B x′ else false)) >>=
λn. if ϕcn is Some 〈x′, y′〉 then ret y′ else undef
is the wanted enumerator. J
Given a fixed T one can not prove EPF→ CT since EPF is agnostic to (up to countably
many) oracles in addition to the functions expressible using T . However, EPF always induces
a synthetic abstract model of computation:
Lemma 13. If EPF then there exists an abstract model of computation in which CT holds.
Proof. Assume e : N→ (N 9 N) surjective w.r.t. ≡N9N . Define Tcxn := seval (ecx) n. It is
straightforward to prove that T is monotonic and that CT holds. J
The axiom EPF can be weakened to cover just boolean functions:
EPFB := Σe : N→ (N 9 B). ∀f : N 9 B.∃n.en ≡N9N f
Lemma 14. EPF→ EPFB
The reverse direction seems not to be provable.
4 Halting Problems
For this section we assume ϕ : N → (N → ON) s.t. ∀f : N → ON.∃c.ϕc ≡ran f as in the
axiom EA. Recall that we have ∀p : N→ P. Ep↔ ∃c. Wc ≡N→P p.
We define the self-halting problem K0n :=Wnn and prove our first negative result:
Lemma 15. ¬EK0
Proof. Assume E(λn.¬Wnn). By specification of W there is c s.t. ∀n.Wcn ↔ ¬Wnn. In
particular, Wcc↔ ¬Wcc, which is contradictory. J
Corollary 16. ¬DK0, ¬DK0, ¬DW and ¬DW.
It is also easy to show that W and thus K0 are enumerable:
Lemma 17. EW
Proof. Via f〈n,m〉 := if ϕnm is Some k then Some (n, k) else None. J
Corollary 18. EK0
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Since Bauer [1] bases his development on EA′, he needs the axiom of countable choice to
prove that W is enumerable.
Another well-known traditional result is that a problem is enumerable if and only if it
many-one reduces to the halting problem:
p m q := ∃f : X → Y.∀x.px↔ q(fx) K(f : N→ B) := ∃n. fn = true
Fact 19. For all p : X → P, p m K↔ Sp.
Corollary 20. SK
Corollary 21. For all p : N→ P, p m K↔ Ep.
Using the non-enumerability of K0 we can now prove our first negative result by reduction:
Corollary 22. K0 m K, and thus ¬EK, ¬DK, and ¬DK.
We can also define KN := λf : N→ N.∃n.fn 6= 0:
Fact 23. K m KN, KN m K, KN ≡(N→N)→P λf.∀n.fn = 0, and thus ¬D(λf.∀n.fn = 0).
5 Kleene Trees
In a lecture in 1953 Kleene [27] gave an example how the axioms of Brouwer’s intuitionism
fail if all functions are considered computable by constructing an infinite decidable binary tree
with no computable infinite path. The existence of such a Kleene tree (KT) is in contradiction
to Brouwer’s fan theorem, which we will discuss later. We prove that EPFB implies KT.
For this purpose, we call a predicate τ : LB→ P a (decidable) binary tree if
(a) τ is decidable: ∃f.∀u.τu↔ fu = true
(b) τ is non-empty: ∃u.τu
(c) τ is prefix-closed: If τu2 and u1 v u2 then τu1
We will just speak of trees instead of decidable binary trees in the following.
Fact 24. For every tree τ , τ [] holds.
Furthermore, a decidable binary tree τ . . .
. . . is bounded if ∃n.∀u.|u| ≥ n→ ¬τu
. . . is well-founded if ∀f.∃n.¬τ [f0, . . . , fn]
. . . has an infinite path if ∃f.∀n.τ [f0, . . . , fn]
Fact 25. A tree is not bounded if and only if it is infinite, i.e. if ∀n.∃u.|u| ≥ n ∧ τu.
Fact 26. Every bounded tree is well-founded and every tree with an infinite path is infinite.
Note that both implications are strict: In our setting we cannot prove boundedness from
well-foundedness nor obtain an infinite path from infiniteness, as can be seen from a Kleene tree:
KT := There exists an infinite, well-founded, decidable binary tree.
We follow Bauer [2] to construct a Kleene tree.
Lemma 27. Given EPFB there is d : N 9 B s.t. ∀f : N→ B.∃nb.dn != b ∧ fn 6= b.
Proof. Define dn := enn >>= λb.ret (¬Bb). J
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We define τKu := ∀n < |u|.∀x.seval (dn) |u| = Somex→ u[n] = Somex. Intuitively, τK
contains all the paths u = [b0, b1, . . . , bn] which might be prefixes of d given n as step-index,
i.e. where n does not suffice to verify that d is no prefix of d.
Theorem 28. EPFB → KT.
Proof. We show that τK is a Kleene tree. (a), (b), and (c) are all immediate. For (d) let k
be given. We define f0 := [] and f(Sn) := fn ++ [if Dkn is Somex then x else false]. We
have |fn| = n. In particular, |fk| ≥ k and τK(fk).
For (e) let f : N→ B be given. By the definition of d there is n s.t. dn != b and fn 6= b.
Thus there is k s.t. seval (dn) k = Some b. Now ¬τKu for u := [f0, . . . , f(n + k)] since
seval n (n+ k) = Some b but l[n] = fn 6= b. J
6 Extensionality Axioms
Coq’s type theory is intensional, i.e. f ≡
A→B g and f = g do not coincide. Extensionality
properties can however be consistently assumed as axioms. In this section we briefly discuss
the relationship between CT and functional extensionality Fext, propositional extensionality
Pext and proof irrelevance PI, defined as follows:
Fext := ∀AB.∀fg : A→ B.(∀a.fa = ga)→ f = g
Pext := ∀PQ : P.(P ↔ Q)→ P = Q
PI := ∀P : P.∀(x1x2 : P ).x1 = x2
Fact 29. Pext→ PI
Swan and Uemura [41] prove that intensional predicative Martin-Löf type theory remains
consistent if CT, the axiom of univalence, and propositional truncation are added. Since
functional extensionality and propositional extensionality are a consequence of univalence,
and propositions are semantically defined as exactly the irrelevant types, Fext, Pext, and PI
hold in this extension of type theory. It seems likely that the consistency result can then be
adapted to Coq’s type theory, yielding a consistency proof for CT with Fext, Pext, and PI.
It is however crucial to formulate CT using ∃ instead of Σ. The formulation as CTΣ :=
∀f. Σn. n ∼ f is inconsistent with functional extensionality Fext, as already observed in [43].
Lemma 30. CTΣ → Fext→ ⊥.
Proof. Since CTΣ implies EA, it suffices to prove that λf.∀n.fn = 0 is decidable by Fact 23.
Assume G : ∀f. Σc. c ∼ f and let Ff := if pi1(Gf) = pi1(G(λx.0)) then true else false.
If Ff = true, then pi1(Gf) = pi1(G(λx.0)) and by extensionality of ∼, fn = (λx.0)n = 0.
If ∀n. fn = 0, then f = λx.0 by Fext, thus pi1(Gf) = pi1(G(λx.0)) and Ff = true. J
7 Classical Logical Axioms
In this section we consider consequences of the law of excluded middle LEM. Precisely,
besides LEM, we consider the weak law of excluded middle WLEM, the Gödel-Dummett-
Principle DGP,7 and the principle of independence of premises IP, together with their respective
restriction of propositions to the satisfiability of boolean functions, resulting in the limited
7 We follow Diener [11] in using the abbreviation DGP instead of GDP.
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principle of omniscience LPO, the weak limited principle of omniscience WLPO, and the
lesser limited principle of omniscience LLPO.
LEM := ∀P : P. P ∨ ¬P LPO := ∀f : N→ B.(∃n. fn = true) ∨ ¬(∃n. fn = true)
WLEM := ∀P : P. ¬¬P ∨ ¬P WLPO := ∀f : N→ B. ¬¬(∃n. fn = true) ∨ ¬(∃n. fn = true)
DGP := ∀PQ : P.(P → Q) ∨ (Q→ P ) LLPO := ∀fg : N→ B.((∃n. fn = true)→ (∃n. gn = true))
∨ ((∃n. gn = true)→ (∃n. fn = true))
IP := ∀P : P.∀q : N→ P.(P → ∃n.qn)→ ∃n.P → qn
Lemma 31. LEM→ DGP, DGP→WLEM, LEM→ IP, but the converses are not provable.
Proof. The implications are straightforward. Diener constructs a topological model where
DGP holds but not LEM, and one where WLEM holds but not DGP [11, Proposition 8.5.3].
Pédrot and Tabareau [34] construct a syntactic model where IP holds, but LEM does not. J
Lemma 32. LPO→WLPO and WLPO→ LLPO, but the converse is not provable.
Proof. The implications are trivial. They are strict over IZF with dependent choice [22,
Theorem 5.1] and thus likely strict in constructive type theory. J
LPO is Σ01-LEM andWLPO is simultaneously Σ01-WLEM and Π01-LEM, due to the following:
Fact 33. (∀n.fn = false)↔ ¬(∃n.fn = true)
Both can also be formulated for predicates:
Fact 34. The following equivalences hold
1. LPO ↔ ∀X.∀(p : X → P). Sp→ ∀x. px ∨ ¬px
2. WLPO↔ ∀X.∀(p : X → P). Sp→ ∀x.¬px ∨ ¬¬px
3. WLPO↔ ∀X.∀(p : X → P). Sp→ ∀x. px ∨ ¬px
In our formulation, LLPO is the Gödel-Dummet rule for Σ01 propositions. It can also be
formulated as Σ01 or S de-Morgan rule (2, 3), S-DGP (4), or as double negation elimination
for the totality of S relations into booleans (5):
Lemma 35. The following are equivalent:
1. LLPO
2. ∀fg : N→ B.¬((∃n.fn = true) ∧ (∃n.gn = true))→ ¬(∃n.fn = true) ∨ ¬(∃n.gn = true)
3. ∀X.∀(p q : X → P).Sp→ Sq → ∀x.¬(px ∧ qx)→ ¬px ∨ ¬qx
4. ∀X.∀(p : X → P).Sp→ ∀xy.(px→ py) ∨ (py → px)
5. ∀X.∀(R : X → B→ P).SR→ ∀n.(¬¬∃b. Rnb)→ ∃b. Rnb
6. ∀f.(∀nm.fn = true→ fm = true→ n = m)→ (∀n.f(2n) = false) ∨ (∀n.f(2n+ 1) = false)
We define the principle of finite possibility as PFP := ∀f.∃g.(∀n.fn = false)↔ (∃n.gn = true).
Fact 36. WLPO↔ LLPO ∧ PFP
A principle unifying the classical axioms with their counterparts for Σ01 is Kripke’s schema
KS := ∀P : P.∃f : N→ B. P ↔ ∃n.fn = true:
Fact 37. LEM→ KS
Fact 38. Given KS we have LPO→ LEM, WLPO→WLEM, and LLPO→ DGP.
KS could be strengthened to state that every predicate is semi-decidable (to which KS is
equivalent using AC0,1). The strengthening would be incompatible with CT, but since our
formulation of KS is a consequence of LEM it might be compatible.
In general, the compatibility of classical axioms (without assuming any choice prin-
ciples) with CT seems open. We conjecture that the elimination restriction preventing large
elimination on non-sub-singleton propositions makes LEM and CT consistent in Coq.
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8 Axioms of Russian Constructivism
The Russian school of constructivism morally identifies functions with computable functions,
sometimes assuming CT explicitly. Another axiom considered valid is Markov’s principle:
MP := ∀f : N→ B.¬¬(fn = true)→ ∃n.fn = true
Markov’s principle is consistent with CT [41] and follows from LPO:
Fact 39. LPO↔WLPO ∧MP
Corollary 40. LPO→ MP, but the converse is not provable.
Proof. Herbelin [23] constructs a model of logic where MP holds, but LPO does not. J
As observed by Herbelin [23] and Pédrot and Tabareau [34], IP and MP yield LPO:
Lemma 41. MP→ IP→ LPO
Proof. Given f : N → B there is n0 : N s.t. ∀k. fk = true → fn0 = true using MP and IP:
By MP, ¬¬(∃k.fk = true) → ∃n.fn = true and by IP, ∃n.¬¬(∃k.fk = true) → fn = true,
which suffices. Now fn0 = true↔ ∃n.fn = true and LPO follows. J
A nicer factorisation would be to prove IP→WLPO, but the implication seems unlikely.
Fact 42. The following are equivalent
1. MP
2. ∀X.∀p : X → P.Sp→ ∀x.¬¬px→ px
3. ∀X.∀p : X → P.Sp→ Sp→ ∀x.px ∨ ¬px
4. ∀X.∀p : X → P.Sp→ Sp→ Dp
Proof. 1→ 2 is immediate.
2→ 3: Since S is closed under disjunctions and since ¬¬(px ∨ ¬px) is a tautology.
3→ 4 is immediate by Lemma 6 with Rxb := (px ∧ b = true) ∨ (¬px ∧ b = false).
4→ 1: Let ¬¬(∃n.fn = true). Define p(x : N) := ∃n.fn = true. Now since p has λx.f as
semi-decider and p has λxn.false as semi-decider we can decide p0 using 4. One case is
then immediate, the other is contradictory. J
4 in Fact 42 is oftentimes called “Post’s theorem”. 1↔ 3↔ 4 is already discussed in [17].
While in general Sp is not equivalent to Sp it seems possible that the notions can be
exchanged in the formulations of 3 and 4 in Fact 42, but we are not aware of a proof.
9 Choice Axioms
We consider the axioms of choice AC, unique choice AUC, dependent choice ADC, and
countable choice ACC:
ACX,Y := ∀R : X → Y → P.(∀x.∃y.Rxy)→ ∃f : X → Y.∀x.Rx(fx)
AUCX,Y := ∀R : X → Y → P.(∀x.∃!y.Rxy)→ ∃f : X → Y.∀x.Rx(fx)
ADCX := ∀R : X → X → P.(∀x.∃x′.Rxx′)→ ∀x0.∃f : N→ X.f0 = x0 ∧ ∀n.R(fn)(f(n+ 1)))
AC := ∀XY : T. ACX,Y AUC := ∀XY.AUCX,Y ADC := ∀X : T. ADCX ACC := ∀X : T. ACN,X
Fact 43. ACX,X → ADCX , ACX,Y → AUCX,Y , ADC→ ACC, ACC→ ACN,N, and ACN→N,N → ACN,N.
12 Church’s thesis and related axioms in Coq’s type theory
The following well-known fact is due to Diaconescu [10] and Goodman and Myhill [21]:
Fact 44. AC→ Fext→ Pext→ LEM
Given that ACN→N,N turns CT into CTΣ, and that EA↔ ΣT.CTT we have:
Fact 45. ACN→N,N → Fext→ EA→ ⊥
We will later see that LLPO∧ACN,N implies Weak König’s Lemma, which is incompatible
with KT. Already now we can prove that WLPO ∧ AUCN,B are incompatible with EA:
Fact 46. AUCN,B implies that if ∀n : N. pn ∨ ¬pn, then p is decidable.
Lemma 47. WLPO→ AUCN,B → EA→ DK0
Proof. WLPO implies ∀n.¬K0n∨¬¬K0n. By AUCN,B and the last lemma K0 is decidable. J
Corollary 48. WLPO→ AUCN,B → EA→ ⊥
Recall that Lemma 6 proved S-ACX,N and E-ACN,Y . In ?? we discuss consequences of
this with regards to CT for oracles and in the next section S-ACN,B will be central.
10 Axioms on Trees
We have already introduced (decidable) binary trees and Kleene trees in Section 5. We now
give a broader overview and give formulations of LPO, WLPO, LLPO, and MP in terms of
decidable binary trees, following Berger et al. [5].
Fact 49. Given a tree τ s.t. τu, τu is a tree, where τuv := τ(u++ v).
Note that τu is a tree iff τu. In this case we call τu subtrees and τ[b] a direct subtree of τ .
Lemma 50. The following equivalences hold:
1. LPO↔ every tree is bounded or infinite.
2. WLPO↔ every tree is infinite or not infinite.
3. LLPO↔ every infinite tree has a direct infinite subtree.
4. MP↔ if a tree is not infinite it is bounded.
5. MP↔ if a tree has no infinite path it is well-founded.
Recall Fact 26 stating that every bounded tree is well-founded and that every tree with
an infinite path is infinite. The respective converse implications are known as Brouwer’s fan
theorem FAN and Weak Kőnig’s Lemma WKL respectively:
FAN := Every well-founded decidable binary tree is bounded.
WKL := Every infinite decidable binary tree has an infinite path.
Fact 51. KT→ ¬FAN and KT→ ¬WKL.
Note that FAN is called FAN′∆ in [25] and FAN∆ in [11], and WKL is called WKLD in [18].
Ishihara [25] shows how to deduce FAN from WKL constructively:
Fact 52. Bounded trees τ have a longest element, i.e. ∃u.τu ∧ ∀v. τv → |v| ≤ |u|.
Lemma 53. For every tree τ there is an infinite tree τ ′ s.t. for any infinite path f of τ ′
∀u.τu→ τ [f0, . . . , f |u|].
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Theorem 54. WKL→ FAN
Proof. Let τ be well-founded. By Lemma 53 andWKL, there is f s.t. ∀a. τu→ τ [f0, . . . , f |u|].
Since τ is well-founded there is n s.t. ¬τ [f0, . . . , fn]. Then n is a bound for τ : For u with
|u| > n and τu we have τ [f0, . . . , fn, . . . , f |u|]. But then τ [f0, . . . , fn], contradiction. J
Corollary 55. KT→ ¬WKL.
Berger and Ishihara [4] show that FAN ↔ WKL!, a restriction of WKL stating that
every infinite decidable binary tree with at most one infinite path has an infinite path.
Schwichtenberg [38] gives a more direct construction and mechanises the proof in Minlog.
Berger, Ishihara, and Schuster [5] characterise WKL as the combination of the logical
principle LLPO and the function existence principle S-ACN,B (called Π01-ACC∨ in [5]). We
observe that WKL can also be characterised as one particular choice or dependent choice
principle. The proofs are essentially rearrangements of [5, Theorem 27 and Corollary 5].
Theorem 56. The following are equivalent:
1. WKL
2. LLPO ∧ S-ACN,B
3. ∀R : N→ B→ P. SR→ (∀n.¬¬∃b.Rnb)→ ∃f : N→ B.∀n. R n (fn)
4. ∀R : LB→ B→ P. SR→ (∀u.¬¬∃b.Rub)→ ∃f : N→ B.∀n. R [f0, . . . , f(n− 1)] (fn)
Proof. For WKL→ LLPO we use the characterisation 3 of LLPO from Lemma 50. Let τ be
an infinite tree. By WKL there is an infinite path f . Then τ[f0] is a direct infinite subtree.
For WKL → S-ACN,B let R be total and f s.t. ∀nb. Rnb ↔ ∀m.fnbm = false. Define
the tree τu := ∀i < |u|.∀m < |u|. fi(u[i])m = false. Infinity of τ follows from ∀n.∃u.|u| =
n ∧ ∀i < n.Ri(u[i]), proved by induction on n using totality of R. If g is an infinite path of
τ , Rn(gn) follows from ∀m.τ [g0, . . . , g(n+m+ 1)].
2→ 3 is immediate using characterisation 3 of LLPO from Lemma 35.
For 3→ 4 let F : N→ LB and G : LB→ N invert each other.8 Let R : LB→ B→ P and
f be the choice function obtained from 3 for λnb.R(Fn)b. Then λn.f(G(gn)) where g0 := []
and g(Sn) := gn++ [f(G(gn))] is a choice function for R as wanted.
For 4→ 1 let τ be an infinite tree and let dum := ∃v.|v| = m∧τuv, i.e. dum if τu has depth
at least m and in particular τu is infinite iff ∀m.dum. Define Rub := ∀m.du+ [b]m∨¬du+ [¬Bb].
R is co-semi-decidable (since d is decidable), and ¬Ru true∧¬Ru false is contradictory. Thus
4 yields a choice function f which fulfils τ [f0, . . . , fn] by induction on n. J
11 Continuity: Baire Space, Cantor Space, and Brouwer’s Intuitionism
The total function space N→ N is oftentimes called Baire space, whereas N→ B is called
Cantor space. We will from now on write NN and BN for the spaces.
Constructively, one can not prove that NN and BN are in bijection. However, KT is
equivalent to the existence of a continuous bijection BN → NN with a continuous modulus of
continuity [11]. Furthermore, KT yields a continuous bijection NN → BN [3].
We call a function F : AN → BN continuous if ∀f : AN.∀n : N.∃L : LN.∀g : AN.(map f L =
map g L)→ Ffn = Fgn. A function M : AN → N→ LN is called the modulus of continuity
for F if ∀n : N.∀fg : AN. map f (Mfn) = map g (Mfn)→ Ffn = Fgn. We define:
Homeo(AN, BN) := ∃F : AN → BN.∃M. M is a continuous modulus of continuity for F
8 This so called coding function is easy to construct using known techniques.
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We start by proving that KT↔ Homeo(BN,NN). To do so, we say that u++ [b] is a leaf
of a Kleene tree τK if τKu, but ¬τK(u++ [b]).
Fact 57. For every τK , there is an injective enumeration ` : N→ LB of the leaves of τK .
We define F (f : N → N)n := (`(f0) ++ · · · ++ `(f(n + 1)))[n]. Since leaves can not be
empty, the length of the accessed list is always larger than n and F is well-defined.
Lemma 58. F is injective w.r.t. ≡NB and ≡NN .
Lemma 59. F is continuous with continuous modulus of continuity.
Lemma 60. The following hold for a Kleene tree τK :
1. There is a function `−1 : LB→ N s.t. for all leafs l, `(`−1l) = l.
2. For all l s.t. ¬τK l there exists l′ v l s.t. l′ is a leaf of τK .
3. There is pref : (N→ B)→ LB s.t. pref g is a leaf of τK and ∃n. pref g = map g [0, . . . , n].
We can now define the inverse as G g n := `−1(pref (nxtng)) where nxt g n := g(n+|pref g|).
Lemma 61. F (G g) ≡N→B g.
Lemma 62. G is continuous with continuous modulus of continuity.
The following proof is due to Diener [11, Proposition 5.3.2].
Lemma 63. Homeo(BN,NB)→ KT
Proof. Let F be a bijection with continuous modulus of continuity M . Then τu := ∀0 <
i ≤ |u|.∃k < i.k ∈M(λn.if l[n] is Some b then b else false) 0 is a Kleene tree. J
Theorem 64. KT↔ Homeo(BN,NN) and KT→ Homeo(NN,BN).
Deiser [9] proves in a classical setting that Homeo(NN,BN) holds. It would be interesting
to see whether the proof can be adapted to a constructive proof WKL→ Homeo(NN,BN).
We have already seen that CT is inconsistent with FAN. Besides FAN, in Brouwer’s
intuitionism the continuity of functionals NN → N is routinely assumed:
Cont := ∀F : (N→ N)→ N. ∀f : N→ A.∃L : LN.∀g : N→ A.(map f L = map g L)→ Ff ≡
B
Fg
Since every computable function is continuous, we believe Cont to be consistent with CT.
Combining Cont with ACN→N,N yields Brouwer’s continuity principle,9 called WC-N in [43]:
WC-N := ∀R : (N→ N)→ N→ P.(∀f.∃n.Rfn)→ ∀f.∃Ln.∀g.map f L = map g L→ Rgn
Theorem 65. WC-N→ Cont
WC-N is inconsistent with CT, since the computability relation ∼ is not continuous:
Theorem 66. WC-N→ CT→ ⊥
Proof. Recall that if two functions have the same code they are extensionally equal. By CT,
λfc.c ∼ f is a total relation. Using WC-N for this relation and λx.0 yields a list L and a
code c s.t. ∀g.map g L = [0, . . . , 0]→ c ∼ g.
The functions λx.0 and λx.if x ∈ L then 0 else 1 both fulfil the hypothesis and thus
have the same code – a contradiction since they are not extensionally equal. J
9 But note that Cont→ ACN→N,N → ⊥, since the resulting modulus of continuity function allows for the
construction of a non-continuous function [13].
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12 Conclusion
In this paper we surveyed the known connections of axioms in constructive type theory
with a separate universe of propositions, with a special focus on Church’s thesis CT and
formulations of axioms in terms of notions of synthetic computability. Furthermore, all
results are mechanised in the Coq proof assistant.
In constructive mathematics, countable choice is oftentimes silently assumed, as critised
e.g. by Richman [36, 37]. In contrast, constructive type theory with a universe of propositions
seems to be a suitable base system for matters of constructive (reverse) mathematics sensitive
to applications of countable choice. Due to the separate universe of propositions, such a
constructive type theory neither proves countable nor dependent choice, allowing equivalences
like the one in Theorem 56 to be stated sensitively to choice. We conjecture that the provable
choice principles S-ACX,N and S-ACN,Y in Lemma 6 can not be significantly strengthened.
The theory Berger et al. [5] work in proves D-ACN,B and thus likely also S-ACN,B, since in
our setting it is a direct consequence.
In predicative type theory and type theories with propositional truncation, LEM suffices
to disprove CT, since unique choice is provable. Based on the current state of knowledge in
the literature it seems likely that S-ACN,B and LEM together do not suffice to disprove CT,
which seems to require at least classical logic of the strength of LLPO and a choice axiom for
co-semi-decidable predicates. Thus we conjecture that a consistency proof might be possible
of e.g. LEM ∧ CT for Coq’s type theory.
Another advantage of basing constructive investigations on constructive type theory
is that implementations of type theory in proof assistants readily exist. For this paper,
mechanising the results in Coq was tremendously helpful in keeping track of all details. For
example, many of the presented proofs are very sensitive to small changes in formulations,
and Coq actually helped in understanding the proofs and getting them right.
Besides consistency, another interesting property of axioms is admissbility. For instance,
Pédrot and Tabareau [34] prove MP admissible in constructive type theory. CT seems to
be admissible in constructive type theory in the sense that for every concretely defined
function f : N→ N one can define a program in a model of computation with the same input
output behaviour, as witnessed by the certifying extraction for a fragment of Coq to the
λ-calculus [14]. An admissibility proof could then serve as a theoretical underpinning of the
Coq library of undecidability proofs [20]. However, any formal admissibility proof would
have to deal with the intricacies of Coq’s type theory. It would be interesting to investigate
whether Letouzey’s semantic proof for the correctness of type and proof erasure [31] can be
connected with the mechanisation of meta-theoretical properties of Coq’s type theory [40] in
the MetaCoq project [39], yielding a mechanised admissibility proof for CT in Coq’s type
theory.
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